




Su Chi, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A
Tail Wagging Two Dogs






Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Printed version




Jean-Pierre Cabestan, « Su Chi, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs », 
China Perspectives [Online], 2009/4 | 2009, Online since 13 January 2010, connection on 28 October
2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/4959 
This text was automatically generated on 28 October 2019.
© All rights reserved
Su Chi, Taiwan’s Relations with
Mainland China: A Tail Wagging
Two Dogs
London and New York, Routledge, 2009, xix, 342 pp.
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
1 Who hasn’t heard of Taiwan’s Su Chi? Su has long been a noted figure in the island’s
politics, and became the Secretary General of the National Security Council of Taiwan,
or better the Republic of China (ROC), since President Ma Ying-jeou took office in May
2008,  the  Kuomintang  (KMT)  candidate  having  comfortably  won  the  election  two
months earlier with 58 percent of the votes. Conceived on the mainland but born in
Taiwan in 1949, Su comes from one of many military families of the KMT who owed
their lives to their reinstallation, initially deemed provisional, on a land marked more
by 50 years of Japanese occupation and modernisation than by the seven years of “War
of Resistance Against Japan.”
2 A member of  the  “baby boomer” generation that  benefited from the  first  fruits  of
Taiwan’s  economic  take-off  in  the  1960s,  Su  studied  in  the  United  States  before
teaching at the Chengchi and Tamkang universities on the island. He joined the KMT
and entered the government in 1993, at first as deputy secretary-general in Lee Teng-
hui’s presidential office and then as chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC),
the  ministry-level  body  in  charge  of  dealings  with  Beijing.  After  Chen  Shui-bian’s
election as president in 2000, Su won fame for coming up with the “1992 consensus”
concept  (jiu’er  gongshi)  as  a  compromise  proposal  purportedly  hammered  out  by
representatives of Beijing and Taiwan to explain the “One-China” formula. Su hoped
the  concept  would  help  the  new  Democratic  Progressive  Party  (DPP)  government
resume semi-official talks with the mainland that had been initiated in 1992. 
3 As  a  legislator  between  2005  and  2008,  he  was  one  of  presidential  candidate  Ma’s
confidants,  accompanying  him  as  diplomatic  advisor  on  foreign  trips,  notably  to
Washington in 2006. He played a key role in the election campaign and, unsurprisingly,
joined  Ma’s  administration.  He  has  remained  at  the  helm  of  the  Security  Council
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despite  opposition  calls  for  his  exit  following  the  typhoon  Morakot  devastation  in
August 2009 (he was blamed for Taipei’s initial reluctance to request international aid).
As a leading player in rapprochement attempts between the two Chinas, Su deserves to
be read and understood.
4 I know Su Chi personally, as do many Taiwan-watchers, and enjoy cordial relations with
him. At first I was reluctant to discuss his book. But its hybrid nature as the work of an
academic specialising in cross-strait relations and a political document by a top KMT
leader persuaded me to overcome my hesitation. The reader is hereby alerted to the
risk of subjectivity that might weigh on this review.
5 The  book  is  an  updated  translation  of  the  2003  Chinese  version  entitled  Weixian
Bianyuan: Cong liangguo lun dao yibian yiguo (Brinkmanship: From two-states theory to one-
country-on-each-side) and covers the years 2004-2007, especially the year of Chen Shui-
bian’s controversial election, 2004. 
6 To be frank, its main interest lies in how Su, a member of the KMT and of the Lee Teng-
hui  administration,  “revisits”  the  1990s.  His  analysis  of  the  years  of  “conciliation”
(1991-1994) is detailed and complete, covering secret talks that preceded the public
ones, and in general is quite accurate (Ch. 1). He explains how the “92 consensus” idea
occurred to  him.  Recalling  the  vagueness  of  the  verbal  compromise  worked out  in
November 1992 by the negotiators from Taipei and Beijing, he says the two sides had
not  then openly  rejected  the  formula  dubbed by  the  Taiwanese  media  “One-China,
different interpretations” (yi ge zhongguo, gezi biaoshu), the ROC’s National Unification
Council (NUC) maintaining in August 1992 that “One China = ROC.” Thus there was no
question whatsoever of recognising the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This was in
fact the KMT’s classic interpretation, and the party renewed it in 2000 by adopting Su’s
“consensus,” with Beijing quickly following suit, as is well known.
7 More surprisingly,  he seeks to show (Ch. 2) to what extent Lee’s trip to the United
States  and  to  Cornell  University  in  June  1995  was  the  initial  source  of  all  future
problems and not only the 1995-1996 missile crisis. But his real bête noire is the “two-
state theory”  Lee  put  forward  in  July  1999  (Ch.  3).  Su,  then  heading  the  MAC  but
informed of this initiative at the last minute, had the task of explaining urbi et orbi that
Lee’s  “two-state  theory”  did  not  in  the  final  analysis  contradict  the  “One-China”
principle:  an  impossible  task,  no  doubt,  and  one  that  led  him  to  the  verge  of
resignation. Curiously, however, he tries to explain – none too convincingly – why he
remained in the government (pp. 64 ff.). As actor and then detractor in Lee’s team, Su
offers a highly useful account and sometimes gripping description of the internal forces
(Lee’s advisors such as Tsai Ying-wen, the KMT, and the DPP) and external ones (the
Chinese and US governments) at work. It is the best passage in the book.
8 The Chen Shui-bian years receive a more banal treatment, with the critical and overly
concerned attitude of an opposition politician constantly tempted to be more trenchant
against internal rivals than against the external power threatening his country’s very
existence. Washington’s restraining role (Ch. 8) is finely analysed, too finely perhaps,
given, for example, the excessive importance attached to the link between senior State
Department official Donald Keyser and a Taiwanese spy (p. 260), and risks losing sight
of  the “big picture.”  Chen never had the legislative majority needed to change the
Constitution and legalise the ROC’s real and not notional frontiers. And though he froze
the NUC’s functioning, Chen had only narrow elbow room, crowded by a China growing
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more powerful with each passing day and a Bush administration sticking to the US’s
traditional “One-China” policy.
9 The account  of  2004  is  perhaps  the  most  one-sided,  focused  on  the  Sino-American
irritation  over  Chen’s  referendum  move  and  on  the  KMT’s  inability  to  accept  his
controversial victory over the ill-conceived and unconvincing Lien Chan - James Soong
Chu-yu coalition. This duo had lost the momentum some people credited them with
even before the failed assassination attempt on Chen and his running mate Annette Lu
Hsiu-lien.
10 Lien’s  China  visit  and  the  restoration  of  ties  between  the  KMT  and  the  Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) are briefly, almost summarily, dealt with in the book, whereas
these  party-to-party  relations  hold  a  highly  important  place  in  the  Taipei-Beijing
détente.
11 By now it should be clear that this book gives a glimpse of the understanding and state
of mind, not only of one of the pillars of President Ma’s team, but also of a good part of
the  “pan-Blue camp”  (the  KMT  and  its  allies).  It  should  also  be  clear  that  Su  the
politician has prevailed over the academic, the former overlooking realities the latter
would definitely have noted, and also thereby – more seriously – risking the possibility
of weakening the credibility of Taipei’s current strategy with regard to Beijing. 
12 The first glaring reality is that the “Green camp” (the DPP and its allies), representing
nearly half of Taiwanese people, wants nothing to do with the “1992 consensus.” Chen
may well have invoked the “1992 spirit” many a time, but that was not enough for the
Chinese side to engage in talks with him. Nowhere does Su acknowledge that neither
the NUC set up in 1991 nor the unification guidelines it adopted had any democratic
legitimacy.  In  fact,  the  NUC  was  formed  by  a  president  who  had  not  then  been
democratically elected, and his decisions could in no way reflect any kind of national
consensus.  Moreover,  only  one  (former)  DPP  member  (Kang  Ning-hsiang)  has  ever
served on it. The NUC’s “One-China” definition adopted by Su is in legal conformity
with the old ROC constitution (enacted on the mainland in 1947). However, Taiwan’s
democratisation has  imposed a  new definition,  a  political  one:  the territories  Taipei
currently controls. It was this reality that Lee in 1999 and then Chen in 2002 sought to
impress upon Beijing, Washington, and the world at large. In other words, the “One-
China” definition the KMT is clinging to now is outdated and illegitimate in the eyes of
many Taiwanese people. Moreover, it prevents the ROC from extricating itself from a
non-state  limbo.  In  fact,  the predominant  majority  of  countries  recognise  only  one
China, namely the PRC, with Taiwan as merely a part of it.
13 Su also glosses over Lee’s 1993 bid for Taiwan’s reintegration in the United Nations.
Noted in passing (p. 81), this albeit near-impossible enterprise nevertheless contributed
to consolidating the consensus in Taiwan on its future, which is now being undermined
thanks  to  the  KMT’s  peculiar  infatuation  with  its  old  brother  enemy.  Lee  had
understood that détente and “normalisation” with China would only be valid if  the
process did not hinder the growth in international stature of the ROC/Taiwan. But Su,
probably more than Ma or other KMT leaders, holds that the priority must clearly be
the building of a close relationship with the mainland, eschewing at all cost anything
that might annoy Beijing. But is it in the US interest to see Taiwan lowering its guard? 
14 The third omission concerns Taiwanese identity and consciousness. Numerous books
have shown that the democratisation process, especially the election of the president
by  direct  universal suffrage  since  1996,  consolidated  Taiwanese  national  political
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identity. While admitting the rise in Taiwanese identity to the detriment of the Chinese
one, Su tends too often to cry “electoral manipulation” (p. 49) whenever a politician
plays the identity card. He thereby belittles the island’s past and the collective memory
of  85  percent  of  the  Taiwanese  --  not  a  word,  for  example,  on the  massacre  of  28
February 1947, or on the work of memory and reconciliation by the Lee-led KMT. In
other words, Su adopts a viewpoint bound to be deemed “unificationist” by a great
number of his compatriots, who would be tempted to add that this is “not surprising,
given his mainland background”…
15 Finally, regarding the “92 consensus,” what Su does not deal with is its ambiguous and
limited  nature.  Ambiguous  because  every  time  the  Chinese  leaders  became
discontented  with  the  Taiwanese,  they  denounce  the  “One-China,  different
interpretations”  formula  and  seek  to  impose  on  everyone,  including  the  Taipei
authorities, PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. Limited because Beijing endorsed this vague
definition, or rather absence thereof, only in order to engage in talks on functional issues
with Taipei. This compromise sidelines questions linked to sovereignty, and therefore
cannot resolve them. Now, how can the PRC and the ROC engage in political talks, let
alone negotiate a peace treaty, without dealing with and trying to overcome, one way
or  another,  this  basic  divergence,  and  without  accepting  that  two  Chinese  states
coexist?
16 Su has every right to favour reunification once China becomes a democracy, and that is
probably the only real solution in the long term. But while awaiting this brilliant but
distant and hypothetical future, Su and other “Blue Camp” leaders ought to pay greater
attention to Taiwan’s reality and try to reduce the risk of deepening the island’s social
divisions rather than heightening them by restoring the KMT’s old ideology. Above all,
they ought to devote greater energy towards strengthening their government’s hand in
the difficult negotiations underway since 2008 with Beijing, and not to weaken it by
signalling a viewpoint that is too one-sided and conciliatory to the PRC.
17 As can be seen, I have been frank with Su Chi, hoping this would be of use to Taiwan
and, perhaps more importantly, to be persuasive on the value of reading this book.
18 Translated by N. Jayaram
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